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Admissions of a Director
by SARAH C. ZEARFOSS*
Whenever I am called upon to use the term "diversity," I brace
myself, anticipating the listener's cynical eye roll. Employing that
word is often assumed to be an act of disingenuousness. Although
"diversity" means simply "differing one from another,"' and although
the University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy explicitly
states that "we do not.. . mean to define diversity solely in terms of
racial and ethnic status,"2 there are many - including those who
support race-conscious admissions policies - who nonetheless seem
certain that the universe of diverse characteristics considered by the
Law School Admissions Office begins and ends with race.
Indeed, when I lamented this cynicism to a friend with whom I
went to law school - a friend who disagrees vehemently with my
* Assistant Dean and Director of Admissions, University of Michigan Law School.
A.B., Bryn Mawr College; J.D., University of Michigan Law School. Many thanks to
Jonathan Alger, Evan Caminker, Anne Dutia, William Evans, Daniel Halberstam, Don
Herzog, Roderick Hills, Stephen Hiyama, Maren Klawiter, Jeffrey Lehman, William
Miller, Roberta Morris, Gita Wilder, and Jean Wong for insights, information, and
inspiration.
1. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000).
2. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, REPORTAND RECOMMENDATIONS OF

THE ADMISSIONS COMMITTEE 12-13 (1992), available at http://www.law.umich.edu
/newsandinfo/lawsuit/admissionspolicy.pdf [hereinafter Policy]. In the fall of 1991, a
faculty admissions committee took up the task of drafting a new policy, one explicitly
modeled after the program described in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,

438 U.S. 265 (1978), and one designed to provide guidance to the Admissions Office, for
which a new admissions director had recently been hired. The committee's undertaking
was the first thorough review of the Law School's admissions policy since the 1970s, and
was correspondingly exhaustive. Five professors, two senior administrators, and several
students met regularly, looking at hundreds of application files, reviewing existing data,
and developing correlation studies of law student performance. The resulting policy was
adopted unanimously by the Michigan Law faculty on April 22, 1992. The Law School's
development of its policy occurred wholly independently of, and without reference to, the
admissions policies developed and relied upon by the undergraduate admissions office of
the University of Michigan, at issue in Gratz v. Bollinger,539 U.S. 244 (2003). Given the
markedly different administrative contexts and a decentralized University culture, this is
unsurprising.
[429]
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views on admissions policies - he cheerfully told me that instead of
"diversity," I could use the political right's terminology. This
sounded promising - but it turns out the term he had in mind was the
colloquial phrase denoting equine droppings.
The jolting phrase was, presumably, my old friend's way of
signaling his doubt that a commitment to "diversity" is anything more
than a smokescreen for admitting a certain number of students of
color who, all other things being equal, would not have been
admitted. If so, then he's wrong about that. As reflected in policy
and practice, the University of Michigan Law School assigns a far
broader meaning to diversity than its critics assume, and the effect of
our commitment to enrolling a diverse class is manifest across the
student body as a whole, not merely in the ranks of those students
who are Native American, Hispanic, or African American.

A. Where I Began
My encounter with the diversity maelstrom was sudden. I had
been working for two years as an administrator at the Law School
when, in the midst of the 2000-01 admissions season, I was offered
the position of the Assistant Dean and Director of Admissions. The
Admissions Office was adjusting to a recent move to a new set of
offices, a new software system, and multiple maternity leaves, not to
mention the high-profile lawsuit that had consumed much staff time.
Understandably, then, the Law School exercised its managerial
prerogative to waive the usual two weeks' notice, and I assumed the
new position within days of the offer, on March 1, 2001. At the time,
the trial in our lawsuit had recently concluded but no decision had
been rendered.
During a two-month transition period, my predecessor would
complete making decisions on the year's applications, and I would
handle the rest of the director's duties - managing staff, recruiting
admitted students, and so on. But on March 27, before I completed
my first month on the job, a federal district judge in Detroit ruled that
the Law School's admissions policy was unconstitutional, and
declined to issue a stay.'
3. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Six days later, in
response to our motion, Judge Friedman reaffirmed his decision to deny a stay. Grutter v.
Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 874 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Two days after that, however, the Sixth
Circuit reversed and granted the stay. Grutter v. Bollinger, 247 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2001).
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As a result, we were, in essence, without an admissions policy.
Now, I had obviously been well aware that there was a lawsuit: as an
alumna and employee of the Law School, I had followed the
proceedings with some interest. And certainly, any litigant in a
complex case recognizes that there is at least some possibility of an
adverse outcome. Nonetheless, the proceedings became intensely
personal once I became responsible for running the Admissions
Office. Suddenly, a bomb had exploded in the midst of our admitting
and recruiting, and people expected me to have some ideas about
how to handle it. All in all, I learned an excellent lesson, one that
would have been quite useful had I still been practicing law: the fact
that a lawyer can view a loss with some long-range equanimity,
confident about ultimate success, doesn't mean that the losing client
will feel less panicky in the meantime.
As we awaited the outcome of the Law School's appellate
motion to stay the district court's ruling, all application-reading
ceased and we focused instead on recruiting. The major spring
recruiting event at Michigan Law is what we call the Preview
Weekend, when we invite our admitted students to Ann Arbor and
fte them while presenting visions of a scholarly life in our
community. The first one was scheduled to begin on March 29, two
days after the decision. Having read none of the files and made none
of the decisions up to this point, it felt a little odd to be in charge of
the Preview Weekend - like hosting a party where I knew none of the
guests. Nonetheless, as the prospective students gathered in our
Lawyers' Club lounge, I went around the room introducing myself.
One young man accosted me: "Why," he queried, "does the Law
School have the admissions policy it does? Why do you not want to
admit simply the best students?" I stared at him a bit blankly. We
did want to admit the best students. Didn't we? What on earth was
he asking?
B. Where I Am Now
Over time, the meaning of his question has become clear to me.
That student, and many others, think that schools like Michigan Law
that consider race as one of many factors in the admissions process
maintain, in actuality, a two-tiered system: one group, consisting of
white and Asian American applicants, is admitted for reasons of
"merit" while another, consisting of every other racial group, is
admitted for reasons other than "merit."
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Some, like Justice Thomas, characterize the motive as aesthetic;'
they think we simply want a certain look in our classrooms, that our
goals are superficial rather than substantive. There are some more
generous-minded souls who think we are well-intentioned in seeking
to enhance and broaden the range of perspectives brought to the
classroom, but that we are misguided in treating race as a factor that
will achieve that end.' And some, as I am aware from the many
emails I have received on the topic, are simply hopelessly inarticulate
in conveying what their objection to our policy actually is. But in all
events, none of our detractors thinks that an admissions system that
considers race as a factor could possibly be one honestly aimed at
seeking merit in all its students.
But after two and a half years in this position, having had the
opportunity to read approximately 14,000 applications, select and
recruit two classes, and unearth enormous amounts of data in order to
assist our lawyers in preparing the Law School's appeals in Grutter,
my understanding of what our admissions process is designed to
achieve, and how we go about achieving it, is solid. Were that
prospective student from March 2001 my interlocutor today, I could
say with total certainty that we are indeed seeking to matriculate the
best law students in the country.6 Trouble is, the notion of "best" is
not self-defining.
II.
A. The What and Why of Our Goals
An admissions process at a selective school ought to have
multiple goals that it seeks simultaneously to satisfy, and it is
therefore necessarily complex. At the Law School, our admissions
policy commences with a recognition of our history of educating
many of the most accomplished lawyers in the country: "esteemed
legal practitioners, leaders of the American bar, significant
contributors to legal scholarship and/or selfless contributors to the

4. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349, n.3 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
5. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting: "With the
best of intentions ...the University of Texas School of Law... discriminates ...by giving
substantial racial preferences in its admissions program.").
6. "Our goal is to admit a group of students who individually and collectively are
among the most capable students applying to American law schools in a given year."
Policy, supra note 2, at 1.
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public interest."7 The policy states our commitment to continuing that
course by admitting only those who "have the potential to follow in
these traditions."8 Elsewhere, the policy describes our mission as a
search for students who have "substantial promise for success in law
school."9 The phrasing may be laconic, but the overall purport of the
policy is plain: an unambiguous commitment to excellence in our
student body.
The policy sets as a floor a standard of "expect[ing] [an]
applicant to do well enough to graduate with no serious academic
problems."'" If one is satisfied that this quite minimal hurdle has been
crossed for an individual applicant, how do we make a decision in an
individual case about whether to admit or deny? We certainly can't
admit everyone who crosses that threshold, or we wouldn't have room
to move through the hallways; indeed, we must deny admission to
four out of five of our applicants. There has to be, therefore, some
system for rationally choosing some fraction of those who we think
could "do well enough to graduate with no serious academic
problems," while optimizing the number of people who have
"substantial promise for success."
To do so, we must come to grips with the meaning of the
"substantial promise" standard. It can't reflect simply an aspiration
that those we admit finish with good grades - after all, since we are
not Lake Wobegon, 50% of any class entering the Law School will
necessarily end up graduating in the bottom half." Certainly someone
whose law school grades were low but who was an active campus
leader, or a lively classroom participant - and anecdotal evidence
abounds that the best classroom participants often turn out to be
modest scorers on exams - cannot be classed as one of those dreaded
"admissions mistakes." What about the graduates who have a
distinguished legal career despite not having attained an illustrious
transcript? Institutional folklore has it that at least one of our famous
graduates was a mediocre student at best - but no one would wish to
rescind the offer of admission. Or what about the people who
succeed dramatically in one area of the law school, but not in others?
7.

Id.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2. See also id. at 10 ("We reiterate... that no student should be admitted unless
his or her file as a whole leads us to expect him or her to do well enough to graduate without
serious academic problems.").
11.

GARRISON KEILLOR, LAKE WOBEGON DAYS (1995).
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A patent law professor tells me that some of her most intellectually
alive, deep-thinking students are routinely largely unknown to the
rest of the faculty. Further, having gone back to examine the files of
all those she has extolled to me (the woman has an amazing fifteenyear memory for students who have impressed her), it is undeniable
that virtually none of her all-stars would have been admitted had our
admissions process involved simply selecting the candidates with the
highest combination of Law School Admission Test (LSAT) score
and undergraduate grade-point average (UGPA).
These various students are valued at least as highly by the faculty
and by the Law School community as a whole as those whose graded
performance is consistently impressive. It should come as no surprise
to anyone that an admissions office with the freedom to choose from
among large numbers of well-qualified applicants will seek this type
of variety, and that to do so, it will take "'soft' variables"' 2 into
account, rather than scrutinizing solely the score data. Admissions
officers frequently say that admissions is an art and not a science as a
way of describing the need to use our experience and our intuition in
order to look beyond scores and discern the potential for
contributions to the institutional community. It is the "art" in
admissions that lets us draw conclusions about promise and potential
from information other than scores.
In our admissions policy, we recognize that non-score
information in the application can be useful in several ways. First, we
may learn information that leads us to conclude the LSAT and
UGPA are not predictive of law school performance; 3 we may learn,
for example, that the applicant has a history of outperforming the
predictions of standardized tests, or we may learn that his college
career was marred by some personal tragedy. More generally, the
application "may tell us something about the applicant's likely
4
contributions to the intellectual and social life of the institution. ,1
That latter piece must be broken into two components. First, by
looking closely at an entire academic record, rather than solely at the
UGPA, we may learn information that suggests an applicant will
"have more to offer both faculty and students" than someone else
with a similar, or even higher, UGPA. There is, obviously, an
abundance of factors in an academic record that reveal greater
academic depth than a mere number can, such as a wide-ranging,
12.
13.
14.

Policy, supranote 2, at 5.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 5.
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fearless curriculum, or advanced study and mastery of a particular
subject. 5 Equally important, though distinct, is the "information in an
applicant's file [that] may... suggest that that applicant has a
perspective or experiences that will contribute to the diverse student
body that we hope to assemble."' 6
B. Implementing the Goals
It is unusual to hear any scholarly critic of affirmative action take
issue generally with these goals and the exercise of this sort of
discretion. What is criticized as a matter of policy is the inclusion of
race as any part of the process, and what is universal among the critics
is a conviction that race far outweighs any other consideration." The
argument that race ought not play any role in the process is, of course,
well-trodden ground, and I have nothing novel to contribute to that
discussion. But I do have something to say in response to the
surprisingly common view about the prominence of race in our
decision-making: it is a perception that is dramatically inaccurate. As
15. As a general matter, I have found fixation on the UGPA is not conducive, and indeed
may be counterproductive, to making the best admissions decisions. Knowing that an applicant
has a 3.6 (our median UGPA for the most recent entering class) does not tell me where she earned
it. I therefore cannot know the median at that school (is she in the middle of the pack with a 3.6,
or is she in the top 5%?), and I likewise do not have any basis for assessing the competitiveness
of her fellow students. I do not know whether she took many courses in basket-weaving, or
whether she majored in astrophysics. And so on. The UGPA itself is merely one small
component of the range of information central to interpreting undergraduate performance.
16. Policy, supra note 2, at 5. There are some, I think, who are a bit mystified by our
interest in these sorts of soft variables, and who might question the worth of having all these
different voices in the classroom. Much has been written on the pedagogical value of this sort of
diversity, and I can add little to that. From my personal experience, I would simply note that
having long held views challenged by classmates taught me to be a better lawyer. Hearing a
former police officer speak to search and seizure was illuminating; hearing a former military
officer's take on the United Nations was enlightening; and hearing a fraternity brother's earnest
arguments about statutory rape was mind-blowing to me, a graduate of an all-women's college
(and I like to think my views expanded his frame of reference as well). Moreover, judging a
candidate's scholastic achievements in the context of the rest of his life simply creates a much
fuller picture: tort law may not take "account of the infinite varieties of temperament, intellect,
and education which make the internal character of a given act so different in different men,"
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881), but law school admissions offices
ought to try to.
Our application is designed to give ample opportunity to applicants to tell us about all these
qualities we seek. We ask, therefore, about the applicant's parents' educational level and
employment; when the applicant learned English; whether the applicant had responsibility for
care of dependents, alongside questions about more traditional extracurricular activities; and so
on. Most significant for this purpose are the opportunities we give to applicants to write up to
two essays in addition to a personal statement, explaining any element of the application that is
not clear from the other questions we ask.
17.
The plaintiffs termed it a "super factor." Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821,
836 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
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I will discuss, there are numerous factors, wholly independent of
considerations of race, that play an enormous role in our admissions
process.
1. Leapfrogging

In the course of gathering data for our lawsuit, we carefully
studied the extent to which "soft variables" - that is, factors apart
from the LSAT and UGPA - matter in our admissions process. 8 To
that end, we examined the data for the applicants to the class entering
in 2001, which was, at the time, the most recent class for which we had
the data. 9 Comparing the LSAT and UGPA of each student who
enrolled in 2001 to the list of those who had been denied revealed
something surprising, even to us: 20%, or 76 students, of an enrolled
class of 362 had both lower LSAT and UGPA than at least 100
applicants who had been denied; another nearly 30%, or 103, had
both lower LSAT and UGPA than at least 23 and as many as 99 of
the denied applicants.
In other words, our commitment to matriculating a class that is
not merely promising and talented, but interesting and diverse, meant
that half of the class entering in 2001 was admitted in favor of a
moderate or significant number of denied candidates whose scores
were higher. Internally and informally, we at the Law School came to
refer to this group as "leapfroggers," a shorthand term which has the
virtue of vividness, and which we used to connote the abundance of
energy, initiative, and ambition these students had demonstrated. To
some degree, though, the imagery implicitly validates the notion that
the score criteria are the sole "real" measure of "merit." To the
extent the term suggests that only rarely can a few extraordinary
applicants persuade us to glance away from a numerical grid of LSAT
and UGPA that otherwise inflexibly governs our decisions, it is
misleading. Our process does not consist of framing a presumption
based on the LSAT and UGPA, with a subsequent quick glance
through the file to see if anything offers a rebuttal. In fact, the data
show definitively that this is not the way the system works at all; if
half the class are "leapfroggers," then leapfroggers are, in fact, the
norm.
Now, those who are convinced that we use the term "diversity"
18. Jeffrey S. Lehman, our former Dean and current President of Cornell University,
conceived the design of this research.
19. We have not yet performed this particular exercise with respect to subsequent classes although we may well do so in connection with our ongoing internal commitment to monitoring
our policy and its effect.
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as a smokescreen might anticipate that the leapfroggers are always
underrepresented minorities" but that clearly cannot be the case.
Even our most ardent detractors know that nowhere near 50% of our
student body are underrepresented minorities.2 ' And in fact, as it
turns out, the biggest beneficiaries - racially speaking - of Michigan's

willingness to look beyond the numbers are white and Asian
American."
Specifically, of the seventy-six "significant leapfroggers" - those
whose numbers were lower than 100 or more of the applicants who
were denied admission - thirty-five, or fewer than half, belonged to
the category of underrepresented minorities,23 while forty-one were
from groups where race, as such, would not have been a factor in
making them an offer of admission."
For the "moderate
leapfroggers" - those whose scores were surpassed by twenty-three to
ninety-nine of the applicants who were denied admission - the ratio is
even more striking: about 85% self-identified as white or Asian
American. Given this, it is not surprising that for every Native
American, African American, or Hispanic student whose LSAT and
UGPA placed him or her in the bottom quartile of scores in the
entering class, there was at least one white or Asian American.25 For
every underrepresented minority getting a shot at Michigan Law,
there is a white or an Asian American who is too. 6
20. The Policy does not use the term "underrepresented minority," although that is the term
frequently employed in discussions of affirmative action. The Policy istead speaks of "a
commitment to racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from
groups which have been historically discriminated against, like African Americans, Hispanics and
Native Americans, who without this commitment might not be represented in our student body in
meaningful numbers." Policy, supra note 2, at 12.
21. Between 1992 and 2003, the aggregate percentage of Native Americans, African
Americans, and Hispanics in the entering class ranged from 12.5% (2001) to 20.1% (1994).
22. To be clear, not all underrepresented minorities in the entering class of 2001 were
among the group of those whose scores were lower; indeed, many minority applicants were
themselves "leapfrogged" - that is, were denied despite having higher scores than some students
in the entering class.
23. Twenty-two were African American, eleven were Hispanic, and two were Native
American.
24. Thirty-one were white and nine were Asian American; one chose not to identify his
race.
25. In 2001, of the ninety people in the bottom quartile of LSAT and UGPA scores, 60%
self-identified as white or Asian American.
26. If all I have said is true, then how is it we have been criticized for admitting such a
small percentage of whites with certain scores, in comparison with minorities having the same
scores? At trial, an expert witness for the plaintiff calculated what he termed "the relative odds of
acceptance" for individual minority groups relative to whites, and concluded that "the relative
odds of acceptance for Native American, African American, Mexican American and Puerto Rican
applicants were many times greater than for Caucasian applicants." Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.
Supp. 2d 821, 836-37 (E.D. Mich. 2001). There are many more whites with any given
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2. The World Beyond the Numbers

The premise of the leapfrogger study was that many students are
admitted for reasons other than their scores, and the data show that
most of them demonstrably were admitted for reasons other than
race. If we weren't thinking about scores and we weren't thinking
about race, about what, then, were we thinking? Going back to those
files confirmed the initial, obvious supposition: these students were
admitted because their applications revealed them to be exceptional
on the basis of their "soft variables." That is, admitting these
candidates answered the exhortation of our admissions policy that we
seek to admit students who will contribute to "the intellectual and
social life of the institution"27 in ways and to a degree that their LSAT
and UGPA alone fail to reveal.
The natural question, of course, is: "How so?" And that gets at
the tricky part of this exercise. Some of these files contained
extremely compelling personal stories - stories, I assure you, that you
would love to hear.28 These are not stories, however, that are
appropriate for sharing with a broad audience because to the extent
that they're extremely compelling, they're also so unique as to make
the individuals identifiable. I am left, therefore, with the less riveting
course of describing general categories. 9
Most compelling were the rare students who had overcome
extraordinary obstacles that left me wondering how they were able to
stand upright, let alone fill out law school applications and
supplement them with respectable LSATs and UGPAs. People had
been abandoned by their parents at young ages; some raised
combination of scores than there are members of particular minority groups with those scores hence the term "minority." According to the National Statistical Report of the Law School
Admissions Council for 2001, there were 7058 whites in the national pool whose LSAT was
between 155 and 164, and whose UGPA was 3.5 and above; in contrast, there were 168 African
Americans. Of those, again according to LSAC data, 794 whites applied to Michigan Law in
2001 and thirty-one African Americans did. Thus, even if every time we admitted an
underrepresented minority with low numbers, we admitted a white with identical scores, the socalled "relative odds of acceptance" would nonetheless be heavily in favor of the individual
underrepresented minority because there are just many more whites - in the country, and more
narrowly, within the pool of law school applicants.
27. Policy, supra note 2, at 5.
28. Or at least, anyone who is an admissions officer would love to hear them. I suspect that
most admissions officers have enormous trouble resisting the impulse to make offers to any
applicant whose personal story is compelling, because fundamentally, what draws people to
admissions work is an abiding interest in hearing other people's stories.
29. The admissions policy attempts that general descriptive task by noting that "[o]ne
might, for example, give substantial weight to an Olympic gold medal, a Ph.D. in physics, the
attainment of age 50 in a class that otherwise lacked anyone over 30, or the experience of having
been a Vietnamese boat person." Policy, supra note 2, at 11.
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themselves and siblings from the time of their early teens. People had
been raised in extreme poverty, to the extent that they had no
running water throughout their childhood. People had suffered
serious physical disability or chronic disease. Scholastic achievement
in the face of these odds is, to me, astonishing.
Other students had truly remarkable backgrounds of community
or public service. I do not mean people who work for a U.S.
representative during a summer, or for a year or two after college,
answering constituent mail.3" Rather, there were applicants whose
years of service were significant, and whose depth and breadth of
contribution were noteworthy. The applicant who worked for very
low pay as an investigator for a well-regarded legal services
organization, and who evinced a high degree of motivation to
continue such service as an attorney; the applicants who endured a
high level of personal discomfort and life disruption to volunteer in
third-world countries; the applicants who challenged themselves by
serving as teachers in underfunded urban schools all stood out as
outstanding and desirable additions to the class.
Some applicants had backgrounds that simply set them apart,
and provided them with experiences from which their fellow students
could learn. Military service, entrepreneurship, Ph.D.s and M.D.s,
and impressive athletic accomplishments all made a difference for
some applicants. Other applicants had personal qualities that are
unusual and that we value accordingly: some were non-U.S. citizens
whose country of origin had significant cultural differences from the
United States; some were lesbian and gay; some were older, returning
to school after a hiatus of decades; some were of ethnicities that,
while not formally mentioned in our admissions policy, we view as
important voices - Arab American, for example, or Hmong.3"
One difficulty in assessing these files and attempting to judge,
after the fact, what might have made the difference for an applicant,
and the extent of the difference it made, is my sense that students'
stories do not fall neatly into discrete categories of "LSAT and
UGPA not predictive" and "likely to contribute to social life" and
"likely to contribute to intellectual life." For example, an applicant
who grows up in China and learns English in high school might be
30. To be clear, I do find that sort of experience valuable; it is not, however, so unusual in
the applicant pool as to be a factor that, without more, will overcome significant weaknesses in
the LSAT and/or UGPA. Indeed, I remember having a dim suspicion when I was a first-year at
Michigan Law that I was the sole student who had not worked on "The Hill."
31.
Members of these groups would ordinarily be classified as white and as Asian
American, respectively.
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someone for whom we think an LSAT score is not predictive, given
the language issues, but might also be someone whose background we
could reasonably expect would lead him to make special contributions
to both the social and the intellectual life at the Law School.
There is, moreover, the problem of intersectionality. This same
Chinese applicant might have grown up in poverty, and become a
student activist during college. We have in this one applicant,
therefore, the obstacle of socioeconomic disadvantage overcome as
well as a strong suggestion of leadership. We must understand his
achievements in light of the extraordinary hurdles in his path, but we
are also attracted to his demonstrated potential for leadership, and
intrigued by his unique voice. A military officer might be gay; a Ph.D.
may have an extraordinary record of public service; and so on. Which
factor led to admission? And which factor, had it been absent, would
have put the applicant in the "no" pile? And mightn't the
combination result in a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts?
Finally, when looking past the numbers to a candidate's soft
factors, we are looking for something more than the fact of a
particular experience; rather, we seek evidence that the experience
will be of value in the classroom. If a student will not speak, then it
doesn't matter what he has to say. If a student is inarticulate, then his
interesting experiences will not advance the classroom dialogue. We
find indications of willingness and ability to contribute in the
candidate's power of expression in his or her personal statement and
essays; in the content of recommendation letters; and implicitly,
overall, in the care that is taken with the application as a whole.
Bottom line, one candidate with certain numbers and a certain set of
experiences might fare quite differently from another with identical
numbers and similar background, simply because one was able to
persuade us, and one was not. 2
It is for all these reasons that I tend to be pessimistic about the
possibility of dissecting our process and describing with statistical
precision what, precisely, is the animating principle at work when we
make a decision to admit or deny a particular applicant. I have been
urged to code essays and letters of recommendation as "great,"
"good," "mediocre," and so on, in an attempt to get quantitative
information about the weight of race independent of other variables.
Putting aside my self-interest in not pursuing a task that could
32. The make-up of the rest of the applicant pool will also have an effect, of course. The
more musual a particular individual's background is within our pool, the more likely that
background is to make a positive difference in the outcome.
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radically increase my workload, I would resist such a plan because I
am convinced it would be futile, and suspect it would be misleading.
III. Verifying the Claims/Guarding the Guards
When the Supreme Court opinion issued on June 23, 2003, I was
personally elated. While I had had a great deal of confidence that the
Law School's policy would be found constitutional, I had internalized
the lesson from my first weeks in the position and had attempted to
prepare myself mentally for a summer to be spent in an all-consuming
attempt to craft a new policy. And thanks to the casual remark
uttered by one of our civil procedure professors about a worst-case
scenario, I occasionally allowed myself to imagine a fall and winter
spent in weekly trips to the federal courthouse in Detroit, reporting to
the district judge about every offer and every denial of admission I
made. But the majority opinion seemed to have examined our policy
and practices carefully and fairly, and the outcome put to rest my
anxiety.
One element of the opinion, however, struck me initially as quite
troubling. Justice Rehnquist's dissent states that the Law School's use
of the term "critical mass" to describe its goal for the make-up of
minorities in an entering class "is simply a sham;"33 instead, he asserts,
the Law School's goal is "'outright racial balancing."' 34 His evidence
for this proposition is the relation of our offer rates to the overall
applicant population; specifically, he observes that "the correlation
between the percentage of the Law School's pool of applicants who
are members of the three minority groups and the percentage of the
admitted applicants who are members of these same groups is far too
precise to be dismissed as merely the result of the school paying
'some attention to [the] numbers.' 35 His dissent goes on to set out
tables showing data from between 1995 and 2000, illustrating the
tracking between percentage in the applicant pool and percentage in
the group of admitted applicants. 6
When I read this on the afternoon the opinion issued, I was
convinced that it was simply an error; when I performed the
33. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 367 (2003) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
34. Id.(citation omitted).
35. Id. (citation omitted).
36. Interestingly, the numbers set out by Justice Rehnquist are themselves inaccurate; they
appear to have been taken from data put forth by one of the plaintiff's expert witnesses, rather
than from the Law School's records, and are larger than the actual numbers of offers made.
Nonetheless, his fundamental observation about the similarity in percentages remains basically
accurate, and it is therefore not worth setting out a point-by-point data comparison.
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arithmetic, though, I discovered to my dismay that it was not. Next, I
became convinced that the data from 2001 would show something
radically different; otherwise, I reasoned, the dissent would have
included that data in the table as well. Once again, I performed the
arithmetic, and once again, I discovered I was wrong."

My next, rather desperate, supposition was that for the two years
that I made the admissions decisions, 2002 and 2003, the data would
reveal a different story. That would be disturbing, of course, because
it might suggest some past problem in our process, but at least it
would be redeeming of me. I was denied even 3sthis pathetic
consolation, though, as the phenomenon repeated itself.
There were other aspects of data relied on by the dissents that
were easily rebuttable.39 Justice Rehnquist's apparently damning
argument, however, seemed to be making a more valid observation.
Except for this, I finally realized: it was surprising news to me. The
day the opinion issued was the first day in my life I had ever done the
math to figure out what percentage of the applicant pool consisted of
37. For 2001, Native Americans comprised 0.9% of the applicant pool, and received 1.1%
of the offers; African Americans comprised 8.1% of the applicant pool, and received 8.3% of the
offers; and Hispanics comprised 5.2% of the applicant pool, and received 5.3% of the offers.
38. For 2002, Native Americans comprised 0.7% of the applicant pool, and received 1.3%
of the offers; African Americans comprised 7.3% of the applicant pool, and received 9.1% of the
offers; and Hispanics comprised 5.9% of the applicant pool, and received 6.1% of the offers. For
2003, Native Americans comprised 1.1% of the applicant pool, and received 1.6% of the offers;
African Americans comprised 8.5% of the applicant pool, and received 6.8% of the offers; and
Hispanics comprised 7.2% of the applicant pool, and received 6.8% of the offers.
39. Consider, for example, Justice Kennedy's dissent, which focuses on the percentages of
enrolled minorities as the smoking gun, rather than on the percentages of offers extended
compared to the percentage of applications (thus setting forth a theory wholly inconsistent with
that of Justice Rehnquist). Justice Kennedy first propounds a rather odd theory about the Law
School's having a moving target quota for minorities, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 371-72
(2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) - a theory for which there is not a smidgen of evidence, and
which not even the plaintiffs hinted at, and which simply omits data from any year that conflicts
with the theory. He then extols Amherst College as the standard against which Michigan Law
School comes up short: "[T]he Law School program compares unfavorably with the experience of
Little Ivy League colleges. Amicus Amherst College, for example, informs us that the offers it
extended to students of African-American background during the period from 1993 to 2002
ranged between 81 and 125 out of 950 offers total, resulting in a fluctuation from 24 to 49
matriculated students in a class of about 425. The Law School insisted upon a much smaller
fluctuation, both in the offers extended and in the students who eventually enrolled, despite
having a comparable class size." Id. at 372-73 (citations omitted). This criticism is nothing short
of mystifying. The Law School's offers to African Americans during the same period ranged
from 87 to 138, out of 1024 offers total, resulting in a fluctuation from 21 to 37 matriculated
students in a class size that averaged 350. In other words, Amherst's offers to African Americans
varied by 35%, while the Law School's varied by 37%; the number of African-American students
enrolled at Amherst ranged from about 6% to about 12%, while at Michigan Law School, the
range was about 6% to about 11%. If the data reveal an important difference between Amherst's
practices and the Michigan Law School's, it escapes me.
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African Americans, and what percentage of our offers were made to
African Americans. It is quite clear that the numbers show a
correlation, just as Justice Rehnquist observed - but it is also quite
clear, again, to me if to no one else, that this was not the result of a
conscious effort to have the two numbers correspond. My anxiety on
this point was ultimately put to rest by concluding that my lack of
mens rea obviated the actus reus.
A more critical flaw in the reasoning, though - since I cannot
reasonably expect that detractors of the Law School's admissions
policy to accept on faith my claim of good intentions - is a parallel
observation that Justice Rehnquist failed to make. The percentage of
offers to whites and Asian Americans also tracks those groups'
percentages in the overall applicant pool. Put another way, we see
the same pattern for every single racial category represented in the
applicant pool - not just for particular minorities. No one, though,
has suggested that a desire to satisfy a quota for whites and for Asian
Americans drives our admissions practices. Indeed, I think it likely
that the same phenomenon would be revealed for other categories
that appear in similar numbers in our applicant pool - people whose
last names begin with C or M, for example, or people haling from
California and New York. Data about such groups is the sort of data
the Admissions Office spent lots of time unearthing during the course
of the lawsuit. We know, for example, that between 1992 and 2002,
the percentage of people in the entering class whose last name began
with S varied by only 4.1% (9.7% for the low in 1995, and 13.8% for
the high in both 1996 and 1998), far less than the 7.6% variation for
underrepresented minorities."0 Thus far, no one has accused us of
having a quota for people whose last names begin with S. It may
simply be that when some group consistently appears as a relatively
fixed percentage of our applicant pool, odds are that they will appear
in similar numbers in the pool of admitted students.
IV. Conclusion
To be clear: I do not purport here to give a comprehensive listing
of what we mean when we say "diversity." The possibilities are
endless. But the concept is real, it is not narrowly limited to race, and
it has far-reaching effect in our admissions decisions. While it is true
that the only way to deduce the intentions of the relevant actors in the
admissions debate is by looking closely at the numbers, it is not a

40. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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straightforward inquiry. Indisputably, statistics can illuminate, to
some degree, the black box of the mind of the admissions officer.
That said, admissions decisions are fundamentally complicated and
multi-faceted, and thus not susceptible to easy quantitative analysis.
Again, admissions is an art and not a science; as a result, one
candidate with certain numbers and a certain set of experiences might
fare quite differently than another with identical numbers and similar
background. When I am asked, as I often am, "why was I denied?"
my answer is never satisfactory - not because I wish to obscure, but
because our complex admissions process makes a truly
comprehensive and accurate answer enormously difficult to construct.
If it is difficult to answer that question for any individual applicant,
we must be correspondingly leery about statistics that purport to
answer the question for denied applicants as a whole.

